
Introduction
Between late August and October 2026, Exaforce observed phishing, scanning, and intrusions from rented servers on AS197769, directed at several unrelated organizations we monitor. We attribute this activity to a single threat actor that Exaforce tracks as SILENT CLAIMANT (EXA-2026-001). Exaforce worked with contacts at Amazon Web Services to block the subnet associated with this actor, blocking its impact on all AWS infrastructure.
SILENT CLAIMANT gains initial access through internet-facing applications, replaying breached credentials and abusing account-recovery flows on public web portals. In one environment, an unauthenticated endpoint on a third-party application the organization ran itself exposed that application's long-lived IAM access key and the token that gives its Amazon Elastic Kubernetes Service (EKS) pod an AWS identity. In all instances we observed, the primary goal was to exfiltrate data.
These techniques rely on valid credentials and on application features behaving as designed, so each event looks routine in isolation. The activity stood out when we compared identities with their own history across environments.
Given the volume and velocity at which this actor operated, we assess that SILENT CLAIMANT operates an agentic offensive framework such as ARTEX, which chains large language models to automate reconnaissance and exploitation. Tempo and session-naming artifacts support that judgment.
Background: Tracing the Activity to One Network
We linked this activity by correlating activity across multiple customer tenants. A phishing relay, a scanner, and a burst of sign-in attempts in separate environments each looked like routine internet noise, and all came from addresses in 102.220.160.0/22. Searching the rest of the block surfaced activity going back to late August.
Following the block's ownership produces a chain that crosses two regional registries.
Attacker-controlled host in 102.220.160.0/22, geolocated to a Frankfurt datacenter
-> AS197769 (VPSDEDICATED-AS), created in RIPE in May 2026 for a US company
registered there that February
-> Sponsoring local internet registry: a German hosting provider present at
internet exchanges in Amsterdam and Frankfurt
-> RIPE NCC, the registry for the autonomous system
Address block: registered with AFRINIC to an internet service provider in NigeriaAFRINIC space announced through a RIPE autonomous system is a cross-registry mismatch, and that system was under four months old when this activity began. The combination explains why the addresses carried no reputation, and public feeds including AbuseIPDB and VirusTotal held no entries for the ones we checked. We have no indication that the hosting provider or the sponsoring registry is involved in the activity, and a registration record identifies a registrant rather than an operator.
Tactics and Techniques
Initial Access Through Public Web Portals
Where a portal lets anyone register, SILENT CLAIMANT creates its own account and leaves it dormant, likely to give later activity a plausible history.
In one case, the actor leveraged a flaw in recovery code generation: codes were not bound to the requesting account and did not expire. This allowed the attacker to submit values against accounts it does not own. SILENT CLAIMANT used that weakness to take over existing accounts.
Access Through a Third-Party Application
In one environment, scanning found an unauthenticated endpoint on a third-party application the organization ran in its own AWS account. Reaching that endpoint gave access to the application's own environment. That included the IAM roles for service accounts (IRSA) token of its pod, and a long-lived IAM access key in the application's configuration, where such keys are commonly kept.
Stolen Service Account Tokens
Under IRSA, the AWS SDK in a pod exchanges the pod's token for role credentials in an AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity request, which itself needs no AWS credentials. The token is valid for 24 hours by default, and each exchange returns fresh credentials. A copied token therefore keeps producing sessions until it expires, whether or not the pod still exists.
SILENT CLAIMANT sends stolen tokens to AWS Security Token Service (STS) from its own servers, in some cases with Python's urllib library rather than an AWS SDK. In CloudTrail they look like ordinary web identity federation from an unexpected address. The AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity event identifies the service account whose token was used. The role session names, which the caller chooses, pair a one-letter prefix with a three-digit counter and sometimes a task suffix.
EKS Pod Identity narrows this exposure, because its token exchange also requires the node's credentials, provided pods cannot reach the instance metadata service.
Long-Lived Access Keys
SILENT CLAIMANT also converts long-lived IAM user access keys into temporary session credentials with GetSessionToken. Those credentials keep most of the user's permissions for up to 36 hours, even if the key is deactivated. They also carry a new access key ID, so a watchlist built on the original key misses follow-on calls.
Discovery and Machine-Speed Operation
With working credentials, SILENT CLAIMANT checks its identity and permissions, lists S3 buckets, queries AWS Glue, and probes dozens of services, including EC2, ECR, EKS, IAM, RDS, and Secrets Manager, along with cross-account roles and CloudTrail settings. Some calls carry a user agent styled as internal tooling.
Sign-in activity and API discovery arrive in bursts measured in minutes, the source address often stays identical across phases that are hours apart, and the sequence moves from one technique to the next and on into data discovery without pausing for a human decision. The pattern reads as a long-running process on a single rented host rather than an operator at a keyboard.
Possible Use of an ARTEX-like Framework
Shared infrastructure and overlapping timing support our assessment that one threat actor conducted this activity.
Session names that pair an incremental counter with a probe-style suffix, the burst tempo, and one source address persisting across phases resemble artifacts that Google Threat Intelligence Group has published for ARTEX. Several unrelated clusters use that tooling, so the overlap does not associate this activity with any of them.
We have not linked SILENT CLAIMANT to a MITRE ATT&CK group ID or to another vendor's named actor, and organizations outside our visibility may also have seen the same infrastructure.
Where Static Detections Fall Short
Detections that rely on fixed indicators had little to match. The addresses came from a network only months old, IP reputation data from reputable intelligence sources (AbuseIPDB, VirusTotal) was clean, and rotation kept per-address counts low.
A recovered account signs in cleanly and an unauthenticated endpoint returns data by design, so the entry itself produced no failures to count. Data pipelines list buckets every day, so alerts on bucket listing alone are mostly noise. A per-identity threshold on denied calls would catch a discovery burst once it is well under way.
Anomaly-based detections that compare each identity with its own history are likely the best leading indicator of such an actor. A workload role federating from outside its cluster network stands out against that history, as does an access key appearing on an unfamiliar network or a service identity calling services it has never used. That comparison is what surfaced this activity in Exaforce.
Indicators of Compromise
To help the wider community hunt for this activity, we are sharing the indicators below. Rented addresses change hands quickly, so the network indicators will age faster than the behavioral ones. We last observed activity from the block in October 2026, and we will update this post if SILENT CLAIMANT moves to new infrastructure.
Network Indicators
Table 1: Network indicators
AS197769 also announces 31.57.37.0/24, 31.57.184.0/24, 31.57.216.0/24, 130.12.181.0/24, and 130.12.182.0/24. We did not observe SILENT CLAIMANT using them, but one address in 31.57.184.0/24 has more than 3,000 public reports of SSH brute forcing. Most organizations can block the entire autonomous system from their sign-in pages and cloud APIs.
Hunting Patterns
These patterns need CloudTrail management read events, because AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity and discovery calls are recorded as read-only. CloudTrail Event history keeps 90 days of management events in each Region, whatever your trail settings. Correlation windows should span several hours.
Table 2: Hunting patterns
User Agents
Table 3: User agents
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
Table 4: MITRE ATT&CK mapping. Tactic names follow the current matrix, which renamed TA0005 from Defense Evasion to Stealth.


